not know if the court had created "good law," because it was simply impossible in 1998 to know exactly how lower courts would interpret the new case law. Now, after two years of lower-court opinions, a clear record has been established and it is therefore possible to ascertain the effect and judge the effectiveness of the 1998 cases.
This article focuses on the court' s Oncale decision and its progeny after first providing a quick overview of sexual-harassment law and the evolution of the same-sex sexualharassment cause of action.
A History of Sexual Harassment
There is no legislation that expressly prohibits sexual harassment. Rather, sexual harassment as a cause of ac tion was first identified by a law professor, and then defined by a voluminous body of case law and scholarship on the topic. Professor Catherine MacKinnon created the cause of action when she published the book Sexual Harassment of Work ing Women.5 MacKinnon defined sexual harassment, in its broadest sense, as the "unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the con text of a relationship of unequal power." Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had prohibited dis crimination based on sex, it didn't create a cause of action for employ ees who were subjected to un wanted sexual advances. The influ ence of MacKinnon' s work was swift and profound,6 and much of the initial debate focused on the meaning and definition of sexual harassment.
In 1980 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) expanded its guidelines on "Dis- person' s psychological well-being, such conduct does not "mark the boundary of what is actionable."11 Thus, as long as the environment "would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious."12 In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia stated that while the holding "does not seem to me a very clear stan dard. .. [b] e that as it may, I know of no alternative to the course the court today has taken."13
In Meritor, and in almost all the other early sexual-harassment cases, the litigants were of opposite sexes, and as such the courts assumed that the motivation behind sexual con duct was the victim' s gender. Ac cordingly, conduct of a sexual nature that was severe or pervasive was automatically regarded as being "because of sex" (and thus in viola tion of Title VII and per se unlaw ful).14 In fact, most courts took this assumption to its logical extension and held that in opposite-sex sexualharassment cases, conduct of a sexual nature is per se unlawful. Such is not the case, however, in same-sex sexual-harassment cases.
Same-sex Sexual Harassment
In the mid-1990s courts were faced with an onslaught of so-called "same sex" sexual-harassment cases. Be tween 1992 and 1997 four different appellate courts faced the question of whether plaintiffs could make out a cause of action in "same sex" cases (i.e., a man harassing a man or a woman harassing a woman). The four different circuits produced four different legal conclusions. Before 
Eighth Circuit. The Eighth
Circuit held that plaintiffs might prevail in same-sex cases if they could prove that members of their gender were subjected to treatment that members of the other gender were not. In Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 16 employees engaged in an ac tivity they described as "bagging." Bagging consisted of one employee hitting and grabbing another em ployee. The plaintiff alleged that at least 12 different male co-workers bagged him. Moreover, there was no evidence that female employees were ever bagged. In finding for the plaintiff, the Eighth Circuit held that employees of either gender could make out a claim for same-sex sexual harassment so long as only one of the genders suffered the con duct alleged. If, however, there was no disparate treatment (i.e., both men and women were treated simi larly, if poorly), then there was no cause of action.
Seventh Circuit. The Seventh
Circuit implied that while conduct of a sexual nature is per se unlawful regardless of the gender of the par ties, same-sex sexual harassment is unlawful if it is motivated by the victim s perceived failure to comply with sexual stereotypes. In the Sev enth Circuit case of Doe v. City of Belleville, two brothers, "J. and H. Doe," alleged that they were physi cally threatened and verbally ha rassed at the construction site where they worked.17 The brother known as "J" was called "fat boy" by his co workers because he was overweight. The employees, including a supervi sor, referred to brother "H " as "fag" or "queer" on a daily basis. One employee, described by the court as a former marine of imposing stature, called H his "bitch" and threatened to take H "out to the woods" and sexually assault him. The threats became physical when the former marine grabbed H by his testicles and announced: "Well, I guess he is a guy." Fearing escalation into outright physical assaults, the broth ers quit their jobs. In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit rejected the argu ment that the sexual orientation of the harasser was relevant, and instead focused on the conduct endured by the plaintiffs. The court argued that conduct with sexual overtures is "because of sex" and thus, if severe and pervasive, is unlawful.18 That standard is not, however, the holding of the case. Instead, the court back tracked and relied on a clear prece dent to justify its finding for the plaintiffs. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, plaintiff Hopkins was de nied a partnership because, accord ing to the Supreme Court testimony, she was not feminine enough for her male colleagues. In finding for Hopkins, the court held that an employer violates Title VII when an employee is denied a term or condi- plaint for four different reasons. First, the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant, the parent company of the subsidiary that actually employed the plaintiff, was, in fact, the employer. Second, the conduct was not severe or pervasive. Third, the company stopped the harassment when it learned of the conduct and, thus, could not be held liable. Finally, the court held that even if Garcia could prove the harassment was severe and pervasive, no cause of action existed under Title VII for same-sex sexual harassment.
Oncale
Two years later the Fifth Circuit was once again faced with a same-sex sexual harassment case. This time the plaintiff' s case did not feature the defects of Garcia. The plaintiff named the proper employer, the employer did not respond to complaints, and, most importantly, the conduct was both severe and pervasive. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
21 According to his lawyer, Nick Canady, Oncale's co-workers, including supervisory personnel, grabbed him, held him, unzipped their trousers and exposed themselves, and threatened to have sex with him. Oncale claimed he was in a shower when these same men got in the shower stall with him, restrained him, and sexually assaulted him using a bar of soap.
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Oncale Defines the Law
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Ser vices, the U.S. Supreme Court re solved the split among the circuits by deciding that a plaintiff could make out a claim for sexual harass ment as long as the harassing con duct was "because of sex."22 The court did not hold, however, that sexual conduct automatically means that the harassment was because of sex. Instead, the court held that the key issue is "whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvanta geous terms or conditions of em ployment to which members of the other sex are not exposed." Thus, according to the court, to prove same-sex sexual harassment, the employee needs to show that only members of one gender are sub jected to the alleged conduct.
In Oncale, the Supreme Court discussed its reluctance to create a general-civility code for the Ameri can workplace. The Supreme Court acknowledged that there are differ ences in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite sex. According to the court:
The prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the work place; it forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the "conditions" of the victim' s employ ment. Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an ob jectively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find hos tile or abusive-is beyond Title VII' s purview. 23 The immediate reaction to the ruling was one of celebration by the plaintiffs' bar, who saw the holding as a victory for all workers, but spe cifically for homosexuals ( In Holman v. Indiana, a husband and wife alleged that the same supervisor sexually harassed them.25 The wife alleged that the male supervisor sexually harassed her by touching her body, standing too close to her, asking her to go to bed with him, making sexual comments, and other wise creating a hostile work envi ronment based on sex. In addition, as a result of her refusal to perform the acts requested, the supervisor nega tively altered her job-performance evaluations and otherwise retaliated against her for rejecting his advances. The Holmans' complaint further alleged that the supervisor harassed the husband by "grabbing his head while asking for sexual favors." When the husband refused such requests, the supervisor retaliated by opening the husband' s locker and throwing away his belongings. The court dismissed the case based on the equal-opportunity- harasser defense. To support its deci sion, the court stated that "the 'equal-opportunity harasser' does not treat plaintiffs differently than mem bers of the opposite sex... [and] under current sex-discrimination theories, there is no discrimination when something happens to both sexes and not simply to one."26 The court concluded by stating: "Simply put, the court concludes that, under current Title VII jurisprudence, con duct occurring equally to members of both genders cannot be discrimi nation 'because of sex'"27 and is therefore not unlawful.
Similarly, in Romero v. Caribbean Restaurants, Inc., the court dismissed the plaintiff' s sexual-harassment case because the supervisor exhibited the same harassing conduct to both men and women.28 Landrau, the plaintiff, alleged his supervisor made an ex plicitly sexual comment to Landrau. The supervisor then repeated the comment to a female employee shortly thereafter. As in Holman, the Romero Court dismissed the case pursuant to the equal-opportunityharasser defense. To support its deci sion, the court stated: "the record clearly shows that Figueroa In Oncale there were no women on the oil rig, so the defense was neither raised nor discussed. A lower court could cite that distinc tion as a basis for refusing to validate the defense. Accordingly, employers should not rely on this defense when deciding whether to litigate or settle a sexual-harassment case. On the other hand, employers are well ad vised to raise the prospect of such a defense in any litigation and in settlement talks. A defense that could potentially absolve an employer from liability should reduce the value of a case, and thus make it easier and less expensive to settle.
Second, the equal-opportunityharasser defense should not be vali dated because it creates strange in centives that are detrimental to employers and employees alike. No employer wants to have sexual ha rassment in the workplace. Even if the conduct is lawful, it reduces pro ductivity and morale and may im pose costs by, for example, increasing turnover. A legal standard that gives managers carte blanche to sexually harass employees (so long as they conduct themselves the same way with both sexes) creates a strange and horrible incentive. Consequently, we contend the 1998 Cornell Quarterly article set forth a better standard.
That article proposed that un wanted conduct of a sexual nature that is severe or pervasive should be per se unlawful.31 Thus, employees would need to prove conduct-but not motivation-when bringing a claim for sexual harassment. Such a standard, we contend, will not result in a general civility code (which the courts seek to avoid, as explained earlier). Moreover, judges and juries can recognize horseplay for what it is. Courts can also recognize when "sexual" comments are not intended to be interpreted literally. The case of Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., supports this notion. In Johnson, two male co workers hated each other.32 To show disdain for his co-worker, one em ployee would repeatedly say to the other, "suck my dick." It was clear from the context of the conversa tions, however, that the speaker had no desire to engage in oral sex with his co-worker. The Seventh Circuit panel, which heard the case after Doe, but before Oncale, stated that conduct of a sexual nature violated Title VII if it was severe or pervasive. The court then dismissed the case, holding that the statements were meant as insults and were not sexual. We agree that the Hondo court properly applied the law to the facts. Moreover, we believe that this standard should be the law of the land and the policy of employers. At this time, however, the equalopportunity-harasser defense appears to be a viable way for some em ployers to avoid or reduce sexualharassment liability.
How Should Managers Use the Defense?
Even though the equal-opportunityharasser defense is a viable method to restrict company liability, we are not advising managers to train their supervisors and employees to harass both men and women. There are at least three reasons for our reluctance to make the defense part of a training program. First, the conduct is repre hensible. Second, harassment without accountability will likely create a human-resources nightmare. Em ployers could expect morale to drop while turnover and employees' interest in unionization rises. Finally, the law may change. The equalopportunity-harasser defense con tradicts the rationale behind the dis crimination law and it is possible that either the U.S. Congress or the Supreme Court may correct the problem. That does not mean, how ever, that the defense is worthless in the meantime. In fact, it should guide managers during harassment investigations.
When investigating "harassment" charges, managers need to ascertain whether the employee is alleging sexual discrimination, gender harass ment, or sexual harassment. In addi tion, because the defense is a viable method for limiting liability, manag ers investigating harassment charges now need to know if the harasser harasses one sex or both. The best time to discover this information is during the initial investigation. After employees hire legal counsel, man agement cannot speak to them with out the presence of their lawyers. If the employee is represented by coun sel, then management will need to have its attorney present as well. At this point, both sides are posturing and preparing their cases. Real infor mation may be hard to extract. More over, the expense of attorney involve ment cannot be ignored. Alternatively, if the manager asks the employee during the initial investigation who the harasser harassed, the defense may be established. If so, management may have resolved the legal issue and will be left to deal only with the humanresources aspect of the issue. Humanresources issues are easier to address because there is no court, no jury, no lawyers, and no judgments. CQ
